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Abstract: 
 
We apply a latent class tobit framework to the analysis of charitable donations at the 
household level where the latent class aspect of the model splits households into two 
groups, which we subsequently interpret as “low” donators and “high” donators. Then 
the tobit part of the model explores the determinants of the amount donated by each 
household conditional on being in that class. We consider both total donations and also 
separately religious donations. Our findings, which are based on US panel data, suggest 
that price and labour income elasticities differ substantially across the two classes. The 
inverse price effect is most pronounced for the “low” donators group for both total and 
religious donations. The labour income elasticity switches direction of influence upon 
charitable donations across the two latent classes with a negative influence for the 
“high” donators group and a positive influence for the “low” donators group, for the 
case of total donations to charity, a pattern which is reversed in the case of solely 
religious donations. 
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I. Introduction and Background 
An extensive empirical and theoretical literature exists exploring why individuals make 
contributions to charity, with much of the existing research focusing on charitable 
donations at the individual and household level in the US (see, for example, Andreoni, 
2006). Given the level of charitable donations in the US, such interest is not 
unexpected: for example, in 2005, individuals in the US donated more than 260 billion 
dollars to charity, with 70-80% of individuals in the US making annual contributions to 
at least one charity (Chhacochharia and Ghosh, 2008). 
Empirical analysis of charitable donations has been conducted over the last four 
decades, which have witnessed methodological advances with respect to econometric 
techniques as well as increased availability and quality of data. Over this time period, 
the econometric methodology has increased in sophistication with the early studies 
adopting a simple log-linear approach. Reece (1979) made an early methodological 
contribution by applying the tobit model to the analysis of cross-section data on 
household donations to charity accounting for the fact that donations cannot be 
negative.  
One problem with the tobit approach, which has been adopted by a number of  
empirical studies of charitable donations including Kingma (1989) and Auten and 
Joulfaian (1996), however lies in the possibility that the decision to donate and the 
decision regarding how much to donate may be characterised by different influences. A 
double-hurdle model is an alternative econometric specification that has been used in 
the existing literature, which allows independent variables to have different effects on 
the probability of making a donation and the level of donation. Such an approach allows 
for a two stage decision-making process. Each individual decides whether to donate 
and, conditional on the decision to donate, then decides how much to donate, where 
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there is potential correlation between the two decision-making processes (see, for 
example, Yen et al., 1997). An alternative approach taken by Smith et al. (1995) to 
account for the two levels of decision-making is the Heckman (1979) two-step 
estimator. 
One issue related to such two part models, however, concerns the sharp 
distinction between participants and non-participants, i.e. those who donate and those 
who do not donate. Another issue is that it is preferable to identify both parts of the 
model via exclusion restrictions on data. However, it is often the case that it is difficult 
to envisage variables that will affect the participation decision and not the amount 
decision, and vice versa. A recent strand of the econometric literature has used latent 
class models as a means to distinguish between different types of individuals, where the 
distinction between groups is made on a more flexible basis than in the two part 
framework. That is, in the double-hurdle framework, there are only two sub-groups of 
the population identified (participants and non-participants). However, in the latent 
class framework, there are potentially an infinite number of population sub-groups 
which can be identified.
 
  
In the health economics literature, the latent class framework has been used to 
distinguish between health groups with high average demand and low average demand 
for health care (see, for example, Deb and Trivedi, 1997, and Bago d‟Uva, 2005). Deb 
and Trivedi (2002) contrast a two part model that distinguishes between users and non-
users of health care with a latent class model that distinguishes between frequent and 
infrequent users. The findings, which are based on analysis of the RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment, indicate that individuals in the frequent and infrequent user latent 
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classes can be described as being ill and healthy, respectively.
1
 Other areas in which the 
latent class framework has been applied include consumer behaviour (see, for example, 
Reboussin et al., 2008, and Swait and Adamowicz, 2001) and transport mode choice 
(see, for example, Shen, 2009). 
In this paper, we apply a latent class tobit framework to the analysis of 
charitable donations at the household level using US panel data, where the latent class 
aspect of the model splits households into two groups, which we subsequently interpret 
as “low” donators and “high” donators. Then the tobit part of the model explores the 
determinants of the amount donated by each group conditional on being a member of a 
particular class.  
The application of the latent class approach seems well-suited to the analysis of 
donations since it allows a flexible approach to the analysis of the donating behaviour of 
individuals and households. In general, latent class models enable us to relatively easily 
incorporate increased heterogeneity into our empirical models. And then, dependent on 
the estimation results, they allow for a convenient “labelling” of the classes. Thus, with 
regard to modelling charitable donations, they appear extremely well-suited as there are 
undoubtedly several sub-groups of the population with regard to giving behaviour. At 
the extreme, following a hurdle-type approach, there would simply be “participants” 
(“givers”, or at least potential givers), and “non-participants” (or “non-givers”). 
However, a much richer characterisation would split the population into “high” and 
“low” donators (or even more sub-groups). In this way, the non-participants in a hurdle-
type setting would necessarily fall into the latter. And now, in the latent class 
framework, these different classes are allowed to react quite distinctly to the same 
personal and economic environment. Such class membership is not likely to vary 
                                                 
1
 Jimenez-Martin et al. (2002), however, highlight one particular disadvantage of the latent class 
approach, which concerns the fact that it is determined by statistical reasoning rather than, in the case of 
the two part model, being an extension of an economic model such as the principal-agent framework. 
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significantly over time, especially over the relatively short time scale over which our 
data is observed, and also we have appropriate (predominantly time-invariant) 
characteristics by which to parameterise such membership.
2
 
In terms of policy aimed at increasing charitable donations, the latent class 
approach is especially illuminating. If the estimation procedure does, indeed, identify 
“high” and “low” givers (or indeed, more groups) then effective policy can be targeted 
at the “high” class of givers. Moreover, say, for example, that the effect of the price of 
donating on the amount of donations was strong for the low class, but weak or absent 
for the high class, then this would suggest that a price-based policy may be relatively 
ineffectual in terms of influencing the overall level of donations. 
We analyse both total donations to all charities and separately donations to 
religious ones (which account for the highest proportion of total donations) in order to 
ascertain whether our results are sensitive to the type of charitable cause. The majority 
of existing supply-side empirical studies explore the determinants of total donations to 
charity at the individual or household level without separately modelling donations 
made to different types of charity, which may reflect data shortages in this area. It is 
apparent that, however, as argued by Karlan and List (2007), p.1791, „perhaps the 
nature of an organization‟s activities influences whether donors contribute to gain 
“moral satisfaction” or to increase the provision of the public good.‟ Hence, it may be 
the case that the motivation behind charitable donations and the level of donation may 
reflect the type of activity associated with the charitable organization.  
Finally, as a point of comparison, we also estimate more “standard” models of 
charitable giving: namely a random effects tobit model and a double-hurdle model. 
Even though the latent class approach is much less parsimonious than these, it still 
                                                 
2
 It should be acknowledged however that unexpected and/or significant events such as a death in the 
family or divorce may lead to changes in donating behaviour. 
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clearly dominates with regard to the information criteria metrics. Thus, we would 
conclude that our approach is preferable on both a priori and statistical grounds. This 
finding also suggests that policy based on the results where such inherent classes are not 
allowed for (that is, the tobit and double-hurdle approaches), may be misleading. 
II.  Econometric Framework: A Latent Class Tobit Model 
The hypothesis is that there are inherently two main types of charity donators in the 
population: “high” and “low” givers. The latter are more likely, for example, to be more 
responsive to changes in the price of charitable donations. However, clearly these 
inherently different types of households will not be directly observed: all that is 
observed is the amount donated to charity. Thus, the approach we follow here is that of 
“latent class” or “finite mixture” models (see Greene, 2008, for example). Essentially 
such approaches implicitly assume that the observed data are drawn from a distinct mix 
of underlying populations. However, in undertaking such an approach, care needs to be 
taken of the specific nature of our dependent variable: household charitable donations. 
As is common in the existing literature on charity (see Andreoni, 2006 for a survey of 
this area), we treat this as a corner solution model, such that we need to employ 
censored tobit model techniques to take into account the quite significant amount of 
censoring at zero (Maddala, 1983). In our case the censoring amounts to 43% of 
observations.  
Thus, the set-up we adopt is a latent class tobit model. This approach amounts to 
first (probabilistically) splitting the sample into two populations (which, prior to 
estimation we envisage to correspond to “high” and “low” donators); and then for each 
of these populations separate tobit models apply. In this way, the same explanatory 
variables in the tobit equation (or “amount of giving” equation) can have differing 
effects across the different classes (for example, as noted above, price).  
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The probabilistic splitting of the sample is based on a Multinomial Logit 
specification (MNL), which can be either a constant across households, or allowed to be 
a function of observed household and head of household characteristics 
iz  with 
associated coefficients . It is possible to allow for a theoretically large number of such 
latent classes. However, we restrict ourselves here to just two-classes, as any further 
number of classes yields an overly heavily parameterised model, and one that is difficult 
to interpret.
3
  
 Finally, we have panel data. In the existing literature, the majority of studies of 
charitable donations at the individual and household level have been based on cross-
section data. One important exception is Auten et al., (2002), who exploit a 12 year 
panel of individual tax returns collected by the US Internal Revenue Service to analyse 
charitable giving within a lifecycle context.
4
 As Greene (2008) points out, the 
availability of panel data significantly aids in the identification of latent class models. 
Indeed, following Greene (2008), we parameterise our model such that (largely) time-
invariant head of household characteristics 
iz  affect the probability of being in each 
class, and the remaining head of household and household characteristics, along with 
any further economic variables (such as price), determining the amount of giving within 
each class. In effect, this amounts to parameterising the household‟s “fixed effect” of 
being in each class. Let 
itx  be the vector of explanatory variables determining the level 
of donations, and let there be 1, ,j J  latent classes (in our case, J = 2), then there 
will be J parameter vectors j  associated with itx  in the different classes. Post 
                                                 
3
 Indeed, convergence problems were encountered in the case of the three-class model, clearly indicating 
that this was an over parameterised model. 
4
 One drawback of this panel data source however relates to the fact that the sample is restricted to those 
tax payers who itemised deductions since there is no information on donations for non-itemisers. 
Consequently, sample selection bias is a possibility. Within a less general context, Okunade et al. (1994), 
who analyse a specific type of donation, university alumni giving, also exploit individual level panel data. 
Panel data has also been analysed within the context of charity level data, see, for example, Khanna et al. 
(1995) for the UK and Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) for the US. 
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estimation, based on the estimated j  vectors, it is possible to estimate (average) 
expected values of giving across the classes, and in this way to determine which classes 
are the “high” and “low” donators.  
Conditional on class membership, which is constant over time by definition, the 
ity  observations on charity donations for household i 1, ,i N  
in period t 
1, , it T  
are independent. Thus, for a typical group of 
iT  
observations, the joint 
density of the sequence of 
iy  is 
1 2
1
, , , , , , ,
i
i
T
i i iT it j it it j
t
f y y y class j x f y class j x        (1) 
 where , ,it it jf y class j x  is given by the standard tobit formulation (Maddala, 
1983). Thus, the overall log-likelihood for a latent class panel of data on charitable 
donations will be 
1 1 1
log log , , ,
iTN J
ij i it it j
i j t
L p z f y class j x
    (2)
 
where ,ij ip z  are the MNL probabilities of being in class j: 
J
j ji
ji
iij
z
z
zp
1
'exp
'exp
,
        (3) 
with 0J  
for identification. Note that all parameters of the model, i.e., those in the 
MNL model determining class membership, and those in the multiple tobit equations, 
are all jointly estimated.
5
 Post estimation, two estimates of the probability of being in 
each class are available. Prior probabilities can be obtained by simply evaluating the 
above expression for ,ij ip z . However, for prediction purposes it is more useful to 
look at the posterior, or conditional on the data, probabilities of (Greene, 2008): 
                                                 
5
 Indeed, this must be the case, as we do not observe class membership. 
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f y y y x p z
  (4) 
III. Data 
We use data from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which is a 
representative panel of individuals ongoing since 1968 conducted at the Institute for 
Social Research, University of Michigan.
6
 In the PSID waves 2001, 2003, 2005 and 
2007, there are a series of detailed questions relating to giving to charity.
7
 Households 
are asked about total donations to charity over the respective calendar years. The mean 
(median) total value of donations in each of the calendar years is as follows: 2001, 
$38.5 ($100.5); 2003, $37.7 ($103.5); 2005, $52.9 ($165.7); and 2007, $51.9 ($175.9), 
with the proportions of households who do not donate in each year being remarkably 
stable at 44%, 45%, 41% and 42%, respectively. We analyse an unbalanced panel of 
data, where, on average, households are in the panel for 3 waves, where the minimum 
(maximum) number of waves is 1 (4). Figure 1 (2) presents the distributions of the 
natural logarithm of the total amount donated to all charities (religious charities) over 
the period for all households and for those who donate.
8,9
 The distributions are also 
decomposed by the gender of the head of household. Summary statistics are presented 
                                                 
6
 One key advantage of the PSID is that it includes households which itemize charitable donations in their 
annual tax return as well as those who do not. Wilhelm et al. (2008) use the 2001 wave in the PSID, as a 
cross-section, to explore the relationship between the generosity of parents and the generosity of their 
adult children. Their findings suggest a positive correlation between charitable giving of parents and their 
children. 
7
 The definition of a charitable organization in the PSID includes „religious or non-profit organizations 
that help those in need or that serve and support the public interest‟. It is clearly stated that the definition 
used does not include political contributions.  
8
 For households reporting zero donations, the value of the natural logarithm of donations is recoded to 
zero, as there are no reported donations between zero and unity. 
9
 Total donations and religious donations are highly positively correlated at 0.791, suggesting that they 
are complements. 
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in Table 1, where, on average, the head of household has 12 years of schooling; 70% are 
male; 24% are aged 40-50; and 50% are married or cohabiting.  
 In our econometric framework, we include numerous explanatory variables, 
which have previously been employed in the literature (see, for example, Andreoni 1996 
and Auten and Joulfaian, 1996). In terms of the explanatory variables in the latent class 
component of the model, following Greene (2008), we include (largely) time invariant 
head of household characteristics: years of completed schooling; gender; the ethnicity of 
the head of household (where groups other than white form the reference category); 
religious denomination, i.e. catholic, protestant and other religion (with no religious 
denomination as the omitted category); and the following age categories, less than 30 
years, 30-39 years, 40-49 years, 50-59 years (above 60 years is our reference category).  
Turning to the tobit part of the model, in line with much of the existing 
literature, here we include: the number of adults in the household; the number of 
children in the household; whether the head of household is currently employed or self-
employed (unemployed or not currently in the labour market is the reference category); 
marital status of the head of household (with all states other than married or cohabiting 
as the base); the natural logarithm of household labour income; the natural logarithm of 
household wealth; the natural logarithm of household non-labour income (including 
benefit income); and year dummy variables.  
Finally, we also include the price of donating in the tobit model. In an early 
contribution, Schwartz (1970) analyses the price of donating to charity, which is 
determined by taxation as income donated to recognised charities in the US is not 
subject to income tax. As a consequence, disposable income falls by less than the full 
amount donated: the price of the donation becomes the donation net of the saving in tax 
since each dollar donated to a recognised charity leads to less than one dollar sacrificed 
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for consumption purposes.
10
 The extent of the tax saving is determined by which 
marginal tax bracket the individual is in (Schwartz, 1970). In the context of the US, 
individuals who itemize deductions in their tax return reduce their taxable income in 
accordance with the level contributed to tax-exempt organisations. Hence, tax 
deductibility affects the price of donating to charity (Auten et al., 2002). Thus, we also 
control for the price of making a donation to charity. For households who itemize 
charitable donations in their tax return, the price of the donation is defined as one minus 
the household‟s marginal tax rate on the contribution made, whereas for households 
who do not itemize charitable donations, the price of the donation is one: donating one 
dollar means that there is one dollar less for consumption.
11
  
We conduct our analysis for total donations to charity and for religious 
donations only. In addition, we also split the analysis by gender of the head of 
household in order to explore differences in donating behaviour across males and 
females.
12
 For example, Schokkaert (2006) finds that households with a female head are 
expected to give more. Indeed, we do find interesting differences across these respective 
latent class specifications, justifying the increased flexibility that it affords. 
IV. Results 
Table 2 reports the results of the determinants of class membership and Table 3 reports 
the (average) expected value of donations within each class (Greene, 2008) denoted by 
E(V). This is shown for both total donations and religious charitable donations and is 
also decomposed by gender of the head of household. From these expected values (see 
                                                 
10
 US tax laws specify an upper bound to deductibility with a maximum deductible percentage of the 
income tax base: 50% of gross income in 2006. 
11
 In the PSID, households are asked to indicate whether they made an itemized deduction for charitable 
contributions. Hence, for these households the price of making a donation is less than one, which is the 
price of donating for those households who did not itemize such donations. Households which itemize are 
assigned the relevant tax rate using the „Tax Table‟ from Internal Revenue Service (US Department of the 
Treasury) website, http://www.irs.gov, conditional upon total pre tax family income and marital status.  
12
 See Yörük (2010) for a comprehensive analysis of the implications of gender differences and household 
bargaining for charitable donations. 
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Table 3), it is clear that in each case class 1 are “high” and class 2 “low” givers to 
charity. In each case we also report the average ex post probabilities of being in each 
class (see Table 2). Again, in each case we can see that probabilities of being in class 2 
(or “low” donators), outweigh those of being in class 1. One interpretation of this is that 
we estimate that most of the population are “low” donators, which is consistent with the 
means of the donations being less than the medians as detailed in Section III.  
As the coefficients in Table 2 correspond to class 1 membership (relative to 
class 2), these coefficients can be interpreted as follows: positive ones being associated 
with higher probabilities of being in class 1 (relative to class 2); and negative ones being 
associated with a higher probability of being in class 2. We can see that there is 
evidence of both gender and life cycle effects, the latter being particularly evident for 
households with heads under the age of 40. Interestingly the results suggest that 
households with a male head, for example, are significantly more likely to be “high” 
givers than female headed households (although this is not true of the level of the 
donation, see below). Education and religion of the head of household are also clearly 
significant predictors of class membership for both overall donations and contributions 
to religious causes only. 
Total Donations to Charity 
As previously noted, the (average) expected values of donation levels for each class are 
reported in Table 3. Clearly, the expected value for class 1 (those households 
subsequently labelled as the “high” contributors group) is considerably larger than that 
for class 2, at $122.73 versus $2.41 (see Table 3). 
Having estimated the prior probability for class membership in Table 3, the (log) 
level of total household donations is modelled via a tobit specification for each 
predicted class, for all households and also decomposed by gender of the head of 
14 
 
household. The column entitled “T.M.E.” gives the overall marginal effect, i.e. across 
all classes.
13
 Coefficients and marginal effects are also reported for each covariate by 
class.  
Due to the possible endogeneity of the price of a donation, which has been 
discussed in the existing literature (see, for example, Yörük, 2009) following Andreoni 
(2006), the last dollar tax price is instrumented using the first dollar tax price of 
donating and household fixed effects. Following Rivers and Vuong (1988), we 
controlled for potential endogeneity by additionally including the residuals from the 
first stage regression in the tobit model. However, this procedure did not influence the 
findings; hence, all results which follow are based upon the last dollar price.
14
  
Focusing upon the overall sample, labour income is found to be positively 
related to the level of the donation, a finding consistent with Auten et al. (2002). 
Specifically, a one percent increase in labour income is associated with a 0.03 per cent 
increase in the level of the donation. However, decomposing the marginal effect into the 
two predicted classes, we find that for class 1, the “high” donators, there is a significant 
negative inelastic association with the level of the donation, whilst for class 2, the “low” 
givers, labour income has a positive inelastic association with charitable contributions. 
Upon decomposing the analysis by gender of the head of household, it becomes clear 
that this is driven by female headed households, since the direction of the impact of 
labour income across the classes is unchanged for male headed households.  
There are clearly large price effects: the level of the donation is strongly 
inversely related to the price, which is consistent with the existing literature (see, for 
example, Glenday et al., 1986). However, it is apparent that those households who are 
                                                 
13
 Calculated as probability weighted class specific marginal effects, 1 1 2 2T.M.E. M.E M.Ep p , 
where 
1
p  and 
2
p  are prior probabilities. 
14
 The results based on the instrumented price variable are available on request. 
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in the “high” donator class are far less sensitive to price changes than the corresponding 
households in the “low” donator class. This is also evident when the sample is 
decomposed by gender of the head of household, although the price elasticities 
estimated for female headed households dominate in terms of magnitude. 
It is clear from Table 3 that, regardless of class membership, there are gender 
differences in the level of donations a finding which is consistent with the existing 
literature, see, for example, Andreoni (2006), with female headed households donating a 
larger amount on average than their male headed counterparts. 
Total Donations to Religious Causes 
As with total donations, the expected value for religious donations is lower for those 
households assigned into class 2 (hence labelled the “low” donator group) at $1.23 
compared to an expected value of $18.73 for class 1 (the “high” donator group of 
givers), see Table 4. 
In Table 4 we present the results for religious charitable donations having 
estimated the prior probability of class membership (see Table 2), where the table has 
the same structure as Table 3. Similar price and labour income effects are found as in 
the case of overall donations, whereby there are clear differences between the two types 
of giver. Interestingly, for each class and across gender of the head of household, 
overall donations have grown over time. However, this is not evident of religious 
donations where there is no overall time effect and the only evidence of growth is 
within the “high” donators class, an effect which is driven by the trend in donations 
made by male headed households to religious causes.  
There is no overall role for household composition either through the number of 
adults or the number of children, which is consistent with the findings in Table 3. One 
noticeable difference is that the more children the head of household has the lower is the 
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level of overall (religious) charitable donations for the “low” (“high”) donator class 
members. In accordance with the findings of Yörük (2010), households with married 
heads, where arguably joint donation decisions are made, donate larger amounts and 
this is an effect over and above income, i.e. this is not due to the fact that households 
with a married head potentially have higher income. Interestingly, the influence of 
marital status upon religious charitable donations is larger for those classified into 
“low” givers. Moreover, those male heads of household assigned to the “low” donators 
group, who are married, donate more than double their single counterparts. Splitting the 
sample by gender reveals that, across the two classes, female headed households have 
higher average expected donations, which ties in with the existing literature.  
Comparison to Alternative Estimators 
As discussed in Section I, the existing empirical literature on charitable donations has 
generally been based on the tobit framework or the double-hurdle approach. The use of 
the latent class approach was motivated in this paper on the basis of the flexibility that it 
provides and its ability to identify “high” and “low” donators. This latter point may be 
especially pertinent from a policy perspective, since socio-economic factors are allowed 
to have differential impacts across the different groups of donators. It is interesting 
therefore to compare the results from the latent class framework with those from tobit 
and double-hurdle specifications in order to ascertain the potential contribution made by 
applying the latent class approach to the modelling of charitable donations. 
In Table 5, the results from estimating a standard random effects tobit model for 
total donations and religious donations for the sample of all individuals are presented. 
For each type of donation, two sets of estimates are reported: firstly, including all 
covariates that were used in the latent class model; and secondly, including only those 
covariates that affect the level of the donation (i.e. the covariates in the tobit part of the 
17 
 
latent class model). In Table 6, the results from adopting a double-hurdle approach to 
model total donations and religious donations are presented, relating to both the 
probability of donating and the level of the donation, where the probability of donating 
is modelled based on the covariates used in the latent class part of the latent class tobit 
model and the amount of the donation is modelled based on the covariates used in the 
tobit part of the model. We also compare the various models in terms of their overall 
statistical performance. In Table 7 the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the 
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) statistics are reported for the latent class tobit, the 
random effects tobit and double hurdle models. Both statistics reveal that statistically 
the latent class tobit estimator is the preferred approach for modelling both total 
charitable donations and those donations to religious causes only. Thus, the relative 
statistical performance of the models endorses our modelling strategy and casts some 
doubt on the approaches traditionally employed in this area. 
Turning to the estimated parameters and their economic intuition, in contrast to 
the results from the latent class model, the tobit estimates reveal no gender effect for 
either overall charitable donations or religious donations. In general, the tobit and 
double-hurdle results are roughly consistent with the “low” donator estimates from the 
latent class model, which accords with expectations since this group dominates in 
probabilistic terms. There are instances however of different signs in some cases: for 
example, the influence of labour market status in the case of religious donations. Such 
findings suggest that results based on the tobit and double-hurdle approaches may not 
adequately reflect the determinants of donating behaviour of the “high” donator group. 
Moreover, these findings also suggest that policy based on such double-hurdle and/or 
tobit results could be inappropriate.  
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Moreover, the tobit and double hurdle approaches do not allow covariates to 
have different effects across the latent groups, which is potentially important. For 
example, the results from the latent class framework suggested that, although total 
donations were inelastic with respect to labour income, the direction of influence 
differed across the “high” and “low” givers. In terms of policy, the latent class results 
suggest that a price-based policy based on tax incentives may not be particularly 
effective since the price elasticity of donating is much stronger for the “low” donator 
class. It should be acknowledged, however, that the amount donated by the “high” 
donator group is considerably larger than that donated by the “low” donator group. 
Hence, the weaker price elasticity of the “high” donator group may still be associated 
with a relatively large level of donations. 
V.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have applied a panel latent class tobit model to the analysis of 
donations to charity at the household level. Somewhat surprisingly, the latent class 
approach has not yet been applied to the analysis of donations to charity in the existing 
literature despite the flexibility of this approach. This econometric framework is such 
that the latent class aspect of the model splits households into two groups, which can 
subsequently be interpreted as “low” donators and “high” donators and the tobit part of 
the model explores the determinants of the amount donated by each group conditional 
on being a member of that class. In the existing literature, the various econometric 
frameworks employed have led to a sharp distinction between those who donate to 
charity and those who do not donate, with the group that donates encompassing a wide 
range of levels of donation. In particular, within the latent class framework, households 
who report zero donations within a given time period are labelled as being “low” givers 
rather than being classified as households that do not give at all as in the traditional 
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approach. Thus, our modelling framework in contrast to the traditional approach does 
not depend on such a sharp distinction – the importance of which is evident when 
comparing the expected values of the level of donations for each group. For example, 
given the low expected values for the “low” givers group, for all donations, $2 to $3 
over the entire calendar year, classifying such households in a group of positive 
donators as in, for example, a double hurdle set-up may mis-classify such households 
given that such low levels of charitable donations may arguably be related to 
measurement error. Furthermore, our empirical analysis suggests that there are 
noticeable differences in the propensity to donate between the “low” and “high” donator 
groups in particular in relation to differences in price elasticity and labour income 
elasticity, which potentially yields interesting insights into the economic motivations 
behind donating behaviour. Finally, in the comparison of the statistical performance of 
the random effects tobit model, the double-hurdle model and the latent class tobit 
model, the latent class approach strongly dominates with regard to the information 
criteria metrics (despite the fact that the latent class approach is much less parsimonious 
than the approaches traditionally employed in this area). Such findings suggest that 
policy based on the results where such inherent classes are not allowed for, that is, the 
tobit and double-hurdle approaches, may be potentially misleading. 
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FIGURE 1: The Distribution of the Natural Logarithm of All Charitable Donations 
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FIGURE 2: The Distribution of the Natural Logarithm of Religious Donations 
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics 
   
ALL FEMALE MALE 
   
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Log Total Donations 
 
3.805 3.498 2.833 3.263 4.230 3.263 
Log Religious Donations 2.621 3.379 2.929 2.983 2.929 3.493 
Head of Household Characteristics 
       Years of Schooling 
 
12.488 3.417 12.148 3.230 12.637 3.484 
Male [0/1] 
  
0.696 0.459 – – 
White [0/1] 
  
0.602 0.489 0.440 0.496 0.673 0.469 
Catholic [0/1] 
  
0.161 0.367 0.122 0.328 0.178 0.382 
Protestant [0/1] 
 
0.509 0.499 0.587 0.492 0.475 0.499 
Other Religion [0/1] 
 
0.015 0.122 0.043 0.202 0.031 0.173 
Aged <30 [0/1] 
 
0.192 0.389 0.213 0.409 0.175 0.379 
Aged 30-40 [0/1] 
 
0.213 0.409 0.189 0.391 0.224 0.417 
Aged 40-50 [0/1] 
 
0.244 0.429 0.227 0.419 0.252 0.434 
Aged 50-60 [0/1] 
 
0.175 0.380 0.136 0.342 0.193 0.394 
Employee [0/1] 
 
0.575 0.495 0.484 0.499 0.612 0.487 
Self Employed [0/1] 
 
0.099 0.298 0.049 0.215 0.120 0.325 
Married or Cohabiting [0/1] 0.503 0.500 0.018 0.131 0.714 0.452 
Household Characteristics 
       Number of Adults [1+] 
 
1.838 0.766 1.365 0.662 2.045 0.716 
Number of Children [0+] 
 
0.862 1.165 0.870 1.208 0.858 1.147 
Log Labour Income 
 
7.916 4.443 6.759 4.636 8.421 4.259 
Log Wealth 
 
1.896 3.302 1.617 3.075 2.018 3.389 
Log Non Labour Income 1.351 3.073 1.937 3.379 1.095 2.892 
Price 
  
0.935 0.094 0.971 0.062 0.919 0.101 
2003 [0/1] 
  
0.254 0.435 0.250 0.433 0.256 0.436 
2005 [0/1] 
  
0.253 0.434 0.265 0.441 0.247 0.431 
2007 [0/1] 
  
0.269 0.444 0.270 0.444 0.269 0.443 
Number of households (i=1,..,N) in unbalanced panel  
  
10,653 3,455 6,972 
OBSERVATIONS (N×T) 
  
30,779 9,357 21,381 
        
 
             TABLE 2: Estimates of the Determinants of Class Membership 
     
 
TOTAL DONATIONS RELIGIOUS DONATIONS 
 
ALL FEMALE MALE ALL FEMALE MALE 
 
COEF S.E. COEF S.E. COEF S.E. COEF S.E. COEF S.E. COEF S.E. 
Intercept -5.179 0.164 -5.759 0.331 -4.435 0.192 -4.654 0.174 -5.686 0.380 -3.987 0.199 
Years of Schooling 0.321 0.011 0.357 0.023 0.299 0.013 0.229 0.012 0.276 0.026 0.208 0.013 
Male 0.523 0.057 – – 0.495 0.065 – – 
White 0.613 0.055 0.457 0.103 0.664 0.068 0.375 0.062 0.244 0.127 0.398 0.077 
Catholic 0.107 0.079 0.276 0.164 -0.001 0.091 0.403 0.089 1.023 0.217 0.329 0.102 
Protestant 0.331 0.059 0.314 0.122 0.286 0.069 0.640 0.067 1.093 0.176 0.563 0.077 
Other Religion 0.286 0.129 0.181 0.246 -0.075 0.169 0.524 0.151 1.384 0.305 0.307 0.190 
Aged <30 -1.415 0.070 -1.106 0.137 -1.484 0.107 -1.633 0.087 -1.633 0.185 -1.512 0.122 
Aged 30-40 -0.945 0.063 -0.792 0.140 -0.951 0.098 -1.098 0.073 -1.292 0.184 -1.000 0.105 
Aged 40-50 -0.394 3.980 -0.582 0.132 -0.358 0.093 -0.509 6.324 -0.837 0.152 -0.404 0.095 
Aged 50-60 -0.187 2.187 -0.076 2.952 -0.287 0.099 -0.379 3.372 -0.422 4.399 -0.358 0.101 
Probability Class 1 ( ) 0.298 0.176 0.336 0.173 0.082 0.195 
Probability Class 2 ( ) 0.702 0.824 0.664 0.827 0.918 0.805 
OBSERVATIONS 30,779 9,357 21,381 30,799 9,357 21,381 
 
TABLE 3: Latent Class Tobit Model for Total Charitable Donations 
 
ALL FEMALE MALE 
  
CLASS 1 CLASS 2 
 
CLASS 1 CLASS 2 
 
CLASS 1 CLASS 2 
 
T.M.E COEF M.E. COEF M.E. T.M.E COEF M.E. COEF M.E. T.M.E COEF M.E. COEF M.E. 
Number of Adults -0.03 0.08 0.05 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.08 -0.12 -0.08 
 
[0.38] [0.00] [0.19] [0.45] [0.68] [0.47] [0.54] [0.00] [0.20] 
Number of Kids -0.13 -0.01 -0.01 -0.31 -0.18 -0.22 -0.04 -0.02 -0.64 -0.27 -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -0.25 -0.17 
 
[0.00] [0.26] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] 
Employee 0.19 -0.14 -0.08 0.51 0.30 0.35 0.04 0.01 1.02 0.43 0.03 -0.16 -0.11 0.14 0.10 
 
[0.13] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.75] [0.00] [0.78] [0.00] [0.51] 
Self Employed 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.16 0.07 -0.11 -0.05 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.35 0.24 
 
[0.46] [0.00] [0.78] [0.87] [0.13] [0.81] [0.02] [0.00] [0.09] 
Married  0.91 0.44 0.25 2.04 1.19 -0.15 0.58 0.24 -0.58 -0.24 1.38 0.64 0.43 2.72 1.85 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.59] [0.00] [0.49] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Log Lab. Income 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.06 
 
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.95] [0.00] 
Log Wealth 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.23 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.19 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.27 0.19 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Log Oth. Income 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04 
 
[0.00] [0.12] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.02] [0.71] [0.02] 
Price -9.38 -3.23 -1.89 -21.53 -12.56 -11.52 -4.46 -1.86 -32.54 -13.58 -9.18 -2.77 -1.88 -18.93 -12.87 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
2003 0.09 0.35 0.21 0.06 0.04 -0.10 0.11 0.05 -0.31 -0.13 0.25 0.39 0.27 0.35 0.24 
 
[0.35] [0.00] [0.77] [0.46] [0.39] [0.42] [0.04] [0.00] [0.19] 
2005 0.49 0.52 0.30 0.97 0.56 0.13 0.21 0.09 0.35 0.15 0.68 0.52 0.35 1.24 0.84 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.30] [0.10] [0.35] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
2007 0.63 0.68 0.40 1.24 0.72 0.25 0.42 0.17 0.64 0.27 0.84 0.70 0.47 1.50 1.02 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06] [0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
E(V) Class j 
 
4.81  ($122.73) 0.88 ($2.41) 
 
5.35    ($210.61) 1.33 ($3.78) 
 
3.22    ($25.03) 0.78 ($2.18) 
Log Likelihood -51,308.94 -14,433.85 -37,505.42 
OBSERVATIONS 30,779 9,357 21,381 
[.] denotes p value; T.M.E denotes overall marginal effect. 
TABLE 4: Latent Class Tobit Model for Religious Charitable Donations 
 
ALL FEMALE MALE 
  
CLASS 1 CLASS 2 
 
CLASS 1 CLASS 2 
 
CLASS 1 CLASS 2 
 
T.M.E COEF M.E. COEF M.E. T.M.E COEF M.E. COEF M.E. T.M.E COEF M.E. COEF M.E. 
Number of Adults 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.04 
 
[0.53] [0.00] [0.68] [0.86] [0.96] [0.86] [0.30] [0.00] [0.42] 
Number of Kids 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.01 -0.52 -0.17 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.16 0.08 
 
[0.86] [0.00] [0.68] [0.00] [0.21] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.01] 
Employee 0.07 -0.18 -0.08 0.31 0.13 0.22 -0.13 -0.04 0.98 0.32 -0.04 -0.18 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05 
 
[0.26] [0.00] [0.20] [0.04] [0.39] [0.02] [0.62] [0.00] [0.73] 
Self Employed -0.04 0.17 0.08 -0.18 -0.08 -0.16 0.06 0.02 -0.71 -0.23 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.25 0.12 
 
[0.50] [0.00] [0.40] [0.22] [0.63] [0.20] [0.19] [0.00] [0.27] 
Married  0.64 0.42 0.18 2.40 1.04 0.07 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.09 1.04 0.62 0.30 3.36 1.61 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.75] [0.25] [0.77] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Log Lab. Income -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
 
[0.02] [0.06] [0.01] [0.18] [0.69] [0.16] [0.28] [0.02] [0.23] 
Log Wealth 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.06 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Log Oth. Income 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.18 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 
 
[0.00] [0.50] [0.00] [0.00] [0.50] [0.00] [0.15] [0.06] [0.18] 
Price -4.31 -2.54 -1.09 -16.13 -6.97 -6.28 -3.32 -1.07 -27.89 -9.04 -4.43 -2.37 -1.14 -14.42 -6.92 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
2003 -0.09 0.29 0.13 -0.39 -0.17 -0.18 0.22 0.07 -0.82 -0.27 0.03 0.29 0.14 0.03 0.01 
 
[0.26] [0.00] [0.18] [0.13] [0.21] [0.11] [0.78] [0.00] [0.93] 
2005 0.12 0.42 0.18 0.36 0.16 -0.10 0.26 0.09 -0.47 -0.15 0.26 0.40 0.19 0.78 0.38 
 
[0.13] [0.00] [0.22] [0.35] [0.11] [0.32] [0.01] [0.00] [0.02] 
2007 0.06 0.57 0.25 0.12 0.05 -0.14 0.46 0.15 -0.65 -0.21 0.21 0.56 0.27 0.56 0.27 
 
[0.41] [0.00] [0.68] [0.23] [0.00] [0.19] [0.05] [0.00] [0.10] 
E(V) Class j 
 
2.93    ($18.73) 0.21 ($1.23) 
 
3.23    ($25.28) 0.41 ($1.51) 
 
1.78    ($5.93) 0.22 ($1.25) 
Log Likelihood -41,849.25 -11,321.09 -31,297.32 
OBSERVATIONS 30,779 9,357 21,381 
[.] denotes p value; T.M.E denotes overall marginal effect. 
     
TABLE 5: Random Effects Tobit for Total Charitable Donations and Religious Charitable Donations 
 TOTAL DONATIONS RELIGIOUS DONATIONS 
 COEF S.E. COEF S.E. COEF S.E. COEF S.E. 
Intercept 5.818 0.425 11.448 0.383 2.995 0.600 6.834 0.519 
Years of Schooling 0.364 0.012 – 0.352 0.019 – 
Male -0.181 0.109 – -0.236 0.170 – 
White 0.745 0.085 – -0.254 0.129 – 
Catholic 0.031 0.110 – 0.912 0.161 – 
Protestant 0.479 0.086 – 1.466 0.127 – 
Other Religion 0.372 0.174 – 0.819 0.251 – 
Aged <30 -2.833 0.132 – -4.173 0.200 – 
Aged 30-40 -1.787 0.130 – -2.889 0.191 – 
Aged 40-50 -1.083 0.123 – -1.694 0.177 – 
Aged 50-60 -0.649 0.115 – -0.931 0.162 – 
Number of Adults -0.096 0.049 -0.110 0.050 -0.093 0.069 -0.021 0.069 
Number of Kids -0.024 0.034 -0.251 0.032 0.160 0.049 -0.073 0.047 
Employee 0.460 0.087 0.369 0.088 0.361 0.120 0.182 0.120 
Self Employed 0.199 0.103 0.315 0.106 0.317 0.144 0.389 0.146 
Married 1.988 0.100 2.255 0.089 2.572 0.150 2.638 0.131 
Log Labour Income 0.072 0.009 0.055 0.009 0.037 0.012 0.002 0.012 
Log Wealth 0.115 0.009 0.171 0.009 0.096 0.013 0.140 0.013 
Log Other Income 0.025 0.009 0.034 0.009 0.017 0.012 0.025 0.012 
Price -10.087 0.359 -12.299 0.366 -9.110 0.495 -10.822 0.495 
2003 -0.313 0.106 -0.030 0.093 -1.189 0.149 -0.126 0.124 
2005 -0.032 0.107 0.393 0.094 -0.935 0.150 0.270 0.125 
2007 0.367 0.107 0.783 0.094 -0.824 0.150 0.401 0.127 
Wald Chi Sq. (d) 5,538.29  p=[0.000] 3,472.37  p=[0.000] 2,534.77  p=[0.000] 1,514.61  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 30,779 
d=22 (12) in columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4).
 TABLE 6: Double Hurdle Model for Total Charitable Donations and Religious Charitable Donations 
 TOTAL DONATIONS RELIGIOUS DONATIONS 
 Prob. of Donation Amount of Donation Prob. of Donation Amount of Donation 
 COEF S.E. COEF S.E. COEF S.E. COEF S.E. 
Intercept -1.414 0.038 9.866 0.120 0.895 0.036 9.113 0.309 
Years of Schooling 0.110 0.002 – 0.022 0.001 – 
Male 0.319 0.016 – -0.074 0.013 – 
White 0.313 0.016 – -0.033 0.011 – 
Catholic 0.037 0.024 – -0.042 0.017 – 
Protestant 0.190 0.017 – 0.171 0.015 – 
Other Religion 0.050 0.041 – 0.098 0.028 – 
Aged <30 -0.808 0.025 – -0.341 0.023 – 
Aged 30-40 -0.409 0.024 – -0.208 0.022 – 
Aged 40-50 -0.200 0.023 – -0.150 0.020 – 
Aged 50-60 -0.005 0.025 – -0.108 0.020 – 
Number of Adults – 0.054 0.017 – -0.051 0.034 
Number of Kids – 0.005 0.010 – -0.052 0.022 
Employee – -0.032 0.037 – 0.240 0.075 
Self Employed – 0.189 0.033 – 0.285 0.078 
Married – 0.334 0.028 – 1.588 0.071 
Log Labour Income – -0.006 0.003 – 0.034 0.007 
Log Wealth – 0.044 0.003 – 0.098 0.009 
Log Other Income – 0.008 0.003 – 0.043 0.008 
Price – -3.770 0.115 – -7.623 0.336 
2003 – 0.122 0.041 – -0.539 0.093 
2005 – 0.263 0.041 – -0.329 0.093 
2007 – 0.510 0.041 – 0.028 0.094 
Wald Chi Sq. (1) test of independence 300.63  p=[0.000] 4,083.34  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 30,779 
 
 
TABLE 7: Model Selection Criteria 
 TOTAL DONATIONS RELIGIOUS DONATIONS 
 
AIC BIC AIC BIC 
Latent Class 3.132 3.139 2.722 2.732 
Tobit (all covariates) 3.821 3.287 3.020 3.026 
Tobit (subset of covariates) 3.873 3.877 3.052 3.055 
Double Hurdle 3.337 3.347 3.880 3.887 
Note: AIC = nkLL 22 , BIC 
= nnkLL log2 ; where LL is the log 
likelihood, k denotes the number of 
estimated parameters and n denotes the 
sample size. 
 
 
 
